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I. Introduction
The First Amendment does not sanction the infliction of
physical injury merely because achieved by word, rather than
act.
–Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.

1

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances.
–U.S. CONST. amend. I.

* LL.M., UCLA Law School, 2011; J.D., University of California, Hastings College
of the Law, 2010; Masters of Science in Journalism, Northwestern University, 2004;
Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, Mass Communications, University of California,
Berkeley, 2003. I would like to thank Professor Curt Hessler for his support throughout
the writing process.
1. Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975).
1
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Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old, committed suicide after
receiving online MySpace messages from a fictitious boy. Her former
friend’s parent, Lori Drew, and Drew’s employee created a false
MySpace account. They pretended to be a boy in order to elicit
statements from Meier that might reveal how Meier felt about Drew’s
2
daughter. In this pursuit of gossip, the character began to take on a
more human shape in Megan’s mind. Meier developed feelings for
this fictitious boy. In an attempt to get Meier to stop liking “him,”
“he” made very cruel statements to Meier, such as “[t]he world would
3
be a better place without you.” Meier had a history of depression
and the hurtful statements from the “boy” led Meier to take her own
life.
Meier’s mom provided a very effective description of
cyberbullying: “I know that they did not physically come up to our
house and tie a belt around her neck . . . But when adults are involved
and continue to screw with a thirteen-year-old—with or without
4
mental problems—it is absolutely vile.” But while Drew and her
employee’s actions may have pushed Meier over the edge,
prosecutors struggled to charge Drew and her employee with a crime.
In fact, the prosecutor’s legal theory against Drew was a result of
5
a technicality, “unauthorized access.” Ultimately, prosecutors relied
6
on a provision of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Drew was
charged because, by creating a fake profile, she violated MySpace’s
Terms of Service. However, a judge threw out the verdict and
acquitted her of the three misdemeanor counts of which she had been
7
convicted. Drew’s employee received immunity in exchange for her
8
testimony against Drew. This case is a prime example of how the
criminal courts are largely ineffective in cases involving cyberbullying.
The Meier family could have brought a civil suit for injurious speech’
on the theory that Drew’s speech, through MySpace, caused them
severe emotional distress. Thus, the question remains: Why didn’t
the Meier family pursue civil remedies?

2. LARRY DOWNES, THE LAWS OF DISRUPTION: HARNESSING THE NEW FORCES
THAT GOVERN LIFE AND BUSINESS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 167 (2009).
3. Id. at 168.
4. Lauren Collins, Friend Game: Behind the online hoax that led to a girl’s suicide,
NEW YORKER (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/01/21/
080121fa_fact_ collins#ixzz1XXTFNnXc.
5. DOWNES, supra note 2, at 168.
6. Kim Zetter, Prosecutors Drop Plans to Appeal Lori Drew Case, WIRED (Sept. 10,
2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/11/lori-drew-appeal.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) provides that a
person “who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of [18
U.S.C. § 1030(g)] may maintain a civil action against the violator to
9
obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief . . .” The best
scenario for the family would have been to use a conviction under the
CFAA to seek a civil award. Once the charges against Drew were
thrown out, however, the Meier family may have decided against
proceeding through the civil courts. Another reason may be that the
alleged tortfeasor, Drew, did not have money to compensate the
Meier family. Even if the Meier’s had a strong case, neither the
10
family, nor its attorney, would be adequately compensated. If this
were the situation, an attorney may have declined to represent the
family on a contingency basis, despite the media attention the
incident received. It is also possible that the Meier family did not
have the means to pay an attorney for the costs associated with
bringing a civil lawsuit. Moreover, the Meier family may have had
difficulty proving causation, which author Alison Virginia King cites
11
as a major challenge in tort law. Here, the “boy’s” statements may
have been extremely hurtful, but they may not amount to having
caused Meier’s death.
To address cyberbullying in cases such as Meier’s, California
Congresswoman
Linda
Sanchez
introduced.
House
of
Representatives Bill 1966, the “Megan Meier Cyberbullying
12
The main thrust of the bill is that if
Prevention Act” in 2009.
someone uses the internet to cause “substantial emotional distress” to
13
another person, they could be fined or sent to prison. The proposed
statute also discusses the psychological toll of cyberbullying. In
addition to causing depression and bringing down a student’s grades,
cyberbullying can “in some cases lead to extreme violent behavior,
14
The bill’s legislative text cites
including murder and suicide.”
research on how common cyberbullying can be; more than half of
mental health professionals had at least one client with a negative
15
online experience, and most of these clients were minors. The bill

9.
10.
Online
(2010).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 456 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the
Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 853
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 111-1966 (2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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did not specify to what degree the online experience was negative.
For example, if two students got into a political argument online and
were upset over it, it likely would not qualify as “cyberbullying,”
because even if it did cause distress, it would cross over into core
freedom of speech territory. While the protection of children, a
particularly vulnerable population, is an important factor in
considering injurious speech in the digital age, it is also important to
balance the values served by the First Amendment. Thus, would the
proposed statute, by essentially criminalizing injurious speech, go too
far in impinging on free speech protections in the digital sphere?
Injurious speech on the Internet poses some interesting issues.
First of all, the speaker can remain anonymous or create a false
identity when posting statements online. Anonymity may remove
social barriers to writing hurtful language. As in the Megan Meier
case, one can pose as someone else to impact the recipient of the
messages to a greater degree. Moreover, there are only minimal
transaction costs to posting content online, and posting a statement
on the web or sending a message to a specific recipient is
instantaneous. Once the statements appear online, they have a global
reach, meaning the potential damage has a much wider scope. In fact,
the speech could cause harm to people that the defendant has never
known and did not intend to reach. Thus, the Internet permits the
harm to extend further than other, more traditional media, raising
international jurisdictional issues, for example, in countries without
an equivalent to the First Amendment. I have chosen, however, to
focus this paper on both injurious speech on the Internet originating
from the United States, and on those from the U.S. who claim to be
injured by the speech.
The Megan Meier case is an example of an unsuccessful attempt
to use the criminal courts as a forum to hold the alleged perpetrator
accountable. Thus, it would be most effective to consider a line of
cases that address injurious speech, an area of law that may inform
future cyberbullying-related cases. While the Megan Meier case was
a criminal case, this paper focuses exclusively on civil cases, where
injurious speech is grounds for tort liability. Another reason why it is
important to begin a discussion of injurious speech with a case such as
Meier’s, is that while it is an especially sympathetic case in favor of
cracking down on potentially injurious speech, it is noteworthy that
even the judge stated that “there is nothing in the legislative history
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of the CFAA which suggests that Congress ever envisioned . . .
16
application of the statute [to cyberbullying].”
But the question remains: Is the terrain of the digital world
already adequately covered by the territory of injurious speech cases?
This paper will examine relevant injurious speech case law in the
more traditional media of print and broadcast in cases such as Hustler
17
18
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, Herceg v. Hustler, Winter v. G.P.
19
20
Putnam’s Sons, Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Company,
21
22
Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., Braun v. Soldier of Fortune, and
23
These cases balance the interest in protecting
Rice v. Paladin.
victims who suffer emotional or physical harm with First Amendment
free speech concerns, providing the lessons that apply to the digital
world in the form of injurious speech on the Internet. Cyberbullying
is one example, but we will see how many of the publications or
broadcasts easily could have been featured online. This paper
explores injurious speech cases involving broadcast or print media,
and analyzes the following issues: (1) Can a public figure sue the press
for intentionally inflicting emotional distress? (2) Does parody have
special First Amendment status? (3) And finally, if a person is
physically injured as a result of reading published information, may
he or she sue the publisher for damages?
I contend that a “notice and takedown” regime would mitigate
the effects of cyberbullying while not overly infringing on the
publisher’s First Amendment rights.

II. Emotional Injury
If the First Amendment will protect a scumbag like me, it will
24
protect all of you.
–Larry Flynt, played by Woody Harrelson
in the movie, The People vs. Larry Flynt

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

King, supra note 10, at 857.
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992).
128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLYNT (Columbia Pictures 1996).
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The film, The People vs. Larry Flynt, cinematically re-created the
events surrounding the Hustler case, which arose out of a Hustler
Magazine parody of advertisements for the alcoholic drink, Campari.
The real Campari advertisements featured a double entendre of
celebrities discussing their “first time,” seemingly at first to describe
their first time engaging in sexual relations, but actually referring to
the first time trying the drink. Hustler magazine’s Campari ad
parody, titled “Jerry Falwell talks about his first time,” had the
double entendre of discussing the fabricated first times that Falwell, a
prominent Evangelical minister of national fame, both had tried
25
But Falwell’s fictitious first
Campari, and had sexual relations.
sexual encounter was especially crude, described as being with his
mother in an outhouse: “I [Falwell] never really expected to make it
with Mom, but then after she showed all the other guys in town such a
26
good time, I figured ‘what the hell!’”
Although there was a
disclaimer on the page that stated, “ad parody—not to be taken
27
seriously,” Falwell did take the matter quite seriously. He sued
Hustler Magazine’s publisher Larry Flynt in a case which reached the
Supreme Court.
The case addressed the issue of whether a public figure can sue
the press for intentional infliction of emotional distress. One could
argue, as Falwell did, that Hustler’s “caricature” of Falwell
fundamentally differs from the political cartoons that satirize
government officials and elevate political discourse. However, the
Court held that it would be one thing if there was a truly effective way
of always correctly distinguishing between both—but there is not.
“Outrageousness,” the Court noted, is subjective, and it would likely
chill free speech if it were up to jurors to decide which speech should
28
be penalized. Thus, parody has special First Amendment status.
Unpopular speech is inherently more likely to irk jurors, but it is
29
precisely the type of speech the First Amendment should protect.
The Court invoked the principles behind the First Amendment: the
ability to have intense debates about political issues and people who
take a prominent role in government or societal conduct. Political
debate is bound to lead to criticism of public figures who, by the very
nature of their fame, shape events. As in defamation cases, if a public
25. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988).
26. Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of
Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 428 (1988).
27. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 48.
28. Id. at 55.
29. Id. at 57.
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figure or public official is negatively portrayed, he can utilize his
30
access to the media to clear his name. While the Supreme Court
referred to the ad parody as “offensive” to Falwell and “gross and
31
repugnant in the eyes of most,” the Court refused to deny it the First
Amendment’s protection.
In Hustler, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
prevents damage awards to public figures to compensate for
emotional distress. “Mr. Flynt’s victory . . . prevented plaintiffs from
doing an end run around the First Amendment by claiming they
32
In other words, even though the
suffered ‘emotional distress.”’
speech was “patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional
injury,” the First Amendment protected the speech, since it could not
“reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the
33
34
public figure involved.” As decided in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
if indeed the statement was a false statement of fact that met the
actual malice standard, Falwell could sue under libel to seek
compensation for injury to his reputation.
The holding in Hustler certainly translates well to injurious speech
on the web. Unlike Meier, who was a private figure, Falwell had an
established reputation. As a result of Hustler, if someone publishes
offensive material online with the intent to cause a public figure
emotional distress, but the public knows that the material did not
state actual facts about that person, as in the case of a parody, the
public figure cannot receive damages. One of the First Amendment’s
gifts is that it protects individuals’ ability to criticize those who have
clout, whether their forum is YouTube or the pulpit. Even if the
criticism is crude or in poor taste, it is still protected speech, whether
in print or on the Internet. Hustler Magazine’s ad parody would
likely appear online if its publication were to occur today, and the
outcome of the case would be the same. Regardless of the fact that
Falwell may have suffered emotional distress as a result of the
injurious speech, one would certainly realize the satirical efforts
illustrated by the contrast between Falwell’s public image as a
minister and the ad’s placement, had it been on Hustler Magazine’s
website.

30. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 304–05 (1964).
31. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50.
32. Gloria Steinem, Op-Ed, Hollywood Cleans Up Hustler, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1997
available at http://www.feminist.com/resources/artspeech/media/flynt.htm..
33. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50.
34. Id.
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Another case involving Hustler Magazine led not to emotional
injury, but a physical injury so serious it resulted in death. Diane
Herceg sued the magazine for the death of her 14-year-old son, Troy
D., who had experimented with autoerotic asphyxiation after reading
35
about it in an article, titled “Orgasm of Death.” The issue in Herceg
was whether the magazine article’s language amounted to incitement
36
to “attempt a potentially fatal act.” The court mentioned types of
speech that do not have full First Amendment protection: “obscene
materials, child pornography, fighting words, incitement of imminent
lawless activity, and purposefully-made or recklessly-made false
37
statements of fact such as libel, defamation, or fraud.” The only
category that the court considered in Herceg from the
aforementioned list is “incitement of imminent lawless activity.” In
that situation, the article would not be protected under the First
Amendment, and its text could render the magazine liable for the
emotional and psychological injury to the boy’s parents as the result
of his death.
However, the court stated the article in Hustler did not fit any of
these categories. In addition, the court decided that the article did
not even amount to advocacy of autoerotic asphyxiation, given that it
included a medical description of why it is a life-threatening practice
38
Moreover, even
and “the seriousness of the danger of harm.”
advocacy, as opposed to incitement, is protected under the First
Amendment. To further understand what “incitement” really is, it is
helpful to consider the court’s example, which it quoted from Noto v.
United States: “the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety
or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the
same as preparing a group for violent action and steering it to such
39
action.” Thus, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
Hustler Magazine and against the mother of the boy. “The
constitutional protection accorded to the freedom of speech and of
the press is not based on the naïve belief that speech can do no harm
but on the confidence that the benefits society reaps from the free

35. Brian Graifman, The Judge Not Chosen and the Hustler Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,
1990, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/17/opinion/l-the-judge-not-chosen-andhustler-case-528190.html.
36. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987).
37. Id.at 1020.
38. Id. at 1023.
39. Id. (quoting 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
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flow and exchange of ideas outweigh the costs society endures by
40
receiving reprehensible or dangerous ideas.”
The lessons from this case apply to injurious speech on the web.
First of all, Hustler Magazine is available online, and the article could
have easily been featured there. Punishing the magazine because of
how a person acted after reading the article could have a chilling
effect on speech in the future: “If the shield of the First Amendment
can be eliminated by proving after publication that an article
discussing a dangerous idea negligently helped bring about a real
injury simply because the idea can be identified as ‘bad,’ all free
41
speech can be threatened.”
Moreover, even if a magazine is
restricted to those over 18 years of age, it may be even easier for
those in a younger age group to access it online than in person, since
the Internet allows for greater anonymity in transactions. In addition,
a lot of articles online allow readers to post comments. The article
may strongly advocate against autoerotic asphyxiation, but what if the
readers write messages extolling the practice? Should the magazine
be held accountable because of the readers’ statements? However,
there are counterarguments. It seems that if the purpose of the article
was to educate about a type of sexual arousal, but just as much to
caution against it, perhaps such an activity should not be featured in a
magazine that caters to people preoccupied enough with sex to the
point they spend money on a magazine dealing with such topics.
Moreover, one could argue that if the article’s purpose was as
previously articulated, then Hustler likely included “unnecessary
42
detail.” For example, the dissent mentioned there were detailed
descriptions of how to engage in the practice, more than just the basic
information. Also, instead of the cautionary warnings in the article
being a deterrent to the practice, they were likely even more enticing
to the readers, who may think of any potential risks as adding another
layer of thrill. While these are noteworthy points, they fail to give
strong support for classifying the article in an unprotected speech
category, in print or online. Publishing an online article, even with
salacious details about this sexual activity, is much different than
providing the young man with the rope and directly helping him hang
himself. While society does have an interest in protecting teenagers
like Troy, holding Hustler civilly liable for its words may create

40. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1119.
41. Id. at 1024.
42. MARC A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON, LIDSKY & LYRISSA BARNETT,
MASS MEDIA LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 445 (7th ed. 2005).
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ambiguous standards which would prevent magazines in print, and
now increasingly more online, from disseminating valuable
information to the public. These unclear guidelines would end up
creating a chilling effect on the First Amendment because authors
43
would be overly cautious of what they publish. Perhaps some people
who read the Hustler article on the web may have been deterred from
the practice because the article described the consequences of
participation. This article could have also saved a life, and its
publication on Hustler’s website could have targeted precisely the
people that would need to hear about these risks.

III. Physical Injury
In Winter, mushroom enthusiasts relied on a book’s information,
became sick from eating unsafe mushrooms, and subsequently
44
brought suit against the publisher.
Two people purchased The
Encyclopedia of Mushrooms, a book that provided information about
picking and cooking mushrooms, among them wild mushrooms. But
after the two people ate the mushrooms, they became so ill that they
required liver transplants. They brought products liability claims
against the publisher. More specifically, the court used a strict
liability theory, which involves finding a defendant liable without a
finding of culpability, such as intent. The court, however, did not
agree to expand the doctrine of strict liability to realms outside of
tangible items. The tangible part of the book itself, its cover, binding,
or its pages did not harm the plaintiffs in the case. It was the content
of the pages, the information provided in the text, which arguably
caused harm when the two people relied on it. It would be a
dangerous suppression of free speech for courts to regulate content
through strict liability theory: “[w]e accept the risk that words and
ideas have wings we cannot clip and which carry them we know not
45
where.” If the content of books were subject to strict liability, where
would courts draw the line?
Authors would surely be more hesitant to write if they knew their
words could be used against them. No publisher would want to
finance “how-to” books if there were litigation risks associated with
the genre. For example, would any author write a book about
learning how to ride a bike if they would be subject to liability any
time someone was injured while trying to learn? Moreover, would a
43. Id.
44. Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991).
45. Id. at 1035.
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cookbook publisher finance a cookbook if it were subject to liability if
a reader, while following a recipe, was burned because he touched a
pan that was too hot? These examples mirror an actual court case
where a student sued a textbook publisher because he was injured
46
doing a science project described in the textbook. But had Winter
been decided otherwise, we might jeopardize the publication of
science textbooks out of an aversion to defending a lawsuit.
The publisher prevailed because the court said it had no duty to
investigate the accuracy of contents of the book it published. In fact,
the court was so wary of imposing a duty to investigate on the
publisher, that it was unwilling to require the publisher to give a
warning saying, “the information in the book is not complete,” or
“the consumer may not fully rely on it,” or “this publisher has not
47
investigated the text and cannot guarantee its accuracy.”
With
regards to the first warning, the court said that the warning would
force a publisher to investigate the contents of the book, precisely
what it did not want the publisher to do. With regards to the last
warning, the court said it was “unnecessary given that no publisher
48
Although two people became
has a duty as a guarantor.”
dangerously ill in the shortterm as a result of relying on the book’s
information, the court was more concerned with the long-term health
of free speech. “The threat of liability without fault (financial
responsibility for our words and ideas in the absence of fault or a
special undertaking or responsibility) could seriously inhibit those
49
who wish to share thoughts and theories’”
The Winter ruling has implications for injurious speech on the
Internet. Winter involved a publisher facilitating the spread of “ideas
50
and information to the public,” which is what Wikipedia and other
encyclopedic resources do via the Internet. Much of the value that
the Internet offers is quick access to information that can generally be
relied upon in making a basic determination, like whether a snake is
poisonous. But even if information comes from a verifiable source,
such as a Center for Disease Control website with information about
snakes, a person must be careful, because after all, they could be
handling a poisonous snake. Surely the Internet would lose much of
its robust information sharing properties if, for example, the federal

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. (citing Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (Sup. Ct. 1981)).
Winter, 938 F.2d at 1035.
Id. at 1038.
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1037 n.8.
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government would have to pay if someone got sick from a snake bite.
Is it not better to have such guides available, even if occasionally
there is one that needs to be revised? The publication’s reach on the
web would likely even be larger than its publication in print, so a
publisher that has content online could face tremendous liability. The
publisher might do a cost-benefit calculation and stay away from
providing advice that could possibly lead to injurious outcomes. One
way to perhaps guarantee further accuracy would be to require
extensive fact checking, but this process would be resource intensive.
Books in print or online would take too long to be published and
would be too costly for anyone to actually purchase, and hence, use.
Implied in Winter is a lesson that applies to the Internet: it serves the
public much better overall to be able to have access to more content,
but the burden to investigate its accuracy should rest with the person
who has the most at stake: the user. After all, the First Amendment
requires it.
51
In Olivia, there was a copycat sexual assault following the
broadcast of a television drama. NBC broadcasted a movie, Born
Innocent, which featured a scene where a group of girls attacked a
young girl in the shower and forcibly used a plunger’s handle to
52
“artificially rap[e]” her. After the movie’s broadcast, a group of
boys attacked and “artificially raped” a nine-year-old girl with a
53
bottle. These boys had seen and talked about that specific scene in
the movie before committing the act. The court declined to use the
low-threshold negligence standard (i.e., asking whether NBC was
negligent in showing the film). Such a standard would surely stifle
debates upon public issues that could normally be raised by films that
may explore controversial content, and “reduce the U.S. adult
54
population to viewing only what is fit for children.” Instead, the
court said the more appropriate test was whether NBC’s broadcast
incited the boys to act upon their victim. In other words, did NBC, by
55
showing the film, “advocate or encourage violent acts?”
What if Born Innocent had been shown online, instead of on
television sets? Olivia’s lessons are analogous to the issues facing the
digital world, because television broadcasts posed ‘“unique and

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 891.
Id.
Id. at 892.
Id.

2011]

ADDING INJURY TO INSULT

13
56

special problems’ that hadn’t existed in prior free speech cases,” in
the same way that the digital world does today.
The First
Amendment ensures that government does not have the power to
curtail “expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
57
As applied to electronic media, “the First
or its content.”
Amendment means that it is the broadcaster that has the authority to
58
make programming decisions.”
The court stated that using a
negligence theory in such cases would result in holding television
stations liable if, for example, a child copied behavior shown on a
59
news program. In other words, news shows might be prevented
from describing a murder that happened in a neighborhood in order
to prevent a person from repeating the same crime. Since many of
news videos are now featured online, this scenario extends to the
digital world. Born Innocent was a fictional movie, and it would be
entirely unreasonable to hold a movie studio or television network
liable if it streamed a movie or television show on the web with a
violent scene that someone decided to emulate. That would certainly
exclude graphically violent films such as American History X, Silence
of the Lambs, or Clockwork Orange. It would also exclude films such
as Saving Private Ryan, a similarly graphic film about World War II.
The reason that movies such as the one in Olivia are given First
Amendment protection, according to the court, is to ensure “the free
flow from creator to audience of whatever message a film or a book
60
might convey,” because otherwise they would censor themselves. In
fact, the court was so concerned with the specter of potentially
censoring a program’s content that it would not allow doing so, even
61
if the restriction was designed to protect a child. The court even
goes so far as to say that a television network would be more wary of
62
having to pay a damage award than facing a criminal penalty. The
California Court of Appeal stated that the way to deter a copycat
rape based on a television broadcast is not to censor the program, but
rather to promote education and punish the party responsible for
63
committing the crime.
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Just like the Internet has a wide and instantaneous reach, so does
64
the radio, albeit on a smaller scale. In Weirum, a radio host at a
station with a large teenage following drove a radio van around the
Los Angeles area for a contest in which whoever found him first
65
A teenager driving in pursuit of the radio
would win money.
personality negligently ran another driver off the road and killed
66
him. The issue in the case was whether the radio station owed the
67
decedent a duty of due care. The California Supreme Court held
that the Los Angeles radio station was liable for the wrongful death
of the driver. But why hold the broadcaster at fault? After all, the
driver caused the accident. The court reasoned, however, that the
teenagers’ “reckless conduct was stimulated by the radio station’s
68
broadcast.” In other words, the broadcaster “was urging listeners to
69
act in an inherently dangerous manner.”
The judge, however, narrowed the scope of the ruling so as not to
impinge on free speech protections. “[The contest] was a competitive
scramble in which the thrill of the chase to be the one and only victor
was intensified by the live broadcasts which accompanied the
70
pursuit.” It is evident the contest was designed to have drivers rush
on the streets, so much so that they would speed past the other
drivers also on the chase. “The issue here is civil accountability for
the foreseeable results of a broadcast which created an undue risk of
71
harm to decedent.” This was an invitation to act, to put speed as a
first priority on the road. In fact one would be rewarded by being
able to appear on the radio and with a monetary prize. Moreover,
although the contest was a limited-time-only promotion, the contest
was promoted throughout the evening and thus “actively and
72
repeatedly encouraged listeners to speed to announced locations.”
In contrast, the scene in Born Innocent in the Olivia case certainly did
not “invite” viewers in any way to use an object such as a plunger
handle to sexually assault a young girl.
Weirum affects injurious speech online in several ways. First of
all, radio stations stream their broadcasts online, making it possible
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for drivers on the road to listen via a digital device, such as a smart
phone. The crucial difference is, with the Internet, even more people
can listen, regardless of whether they are outside the traditional
coverage area. Moreover, many promotions involve sending a text
message with a specific code to a phone number, encouraging the
kind of risky behavior at issue in Weirum. Just as in Weirum, many
radio promotions are very time sensitive, and hosts tend to emphasize
the urgency in much the same way today as they did in Weirum. The
problem is that many listeners are still listening to the radio when
73
they are in their car. After all, gone are the days when families
would sit around the radio to listen to the broadcasts. Some radio
promotions may encourage multitasking on the road. The National
Safety Council released a study stating that cell phone calls or text
74
messages account for almost thirty percent of traffic accidents.
AAA mentioned studies that state that texting increases a driver’s
75
chance of being in an accident eightfold. It certainly is foreseeable
that calling in to a radio show while driving, or texting while
navigating through traffic, could lead to more reckless driving. These
are the same concerns the court had in Weirum, although concerning
different technology. Cell phone use while driving already poses
substantial risks and the radio promotions that integrate such digital
devices, only work to heighten these risks. Given the National Safety
Council’s statistic, the relevance of the foreseeability prong as it
relates to accidents, like the one in Weirum, becomes clear.

IV. Not Fit to Print: Injurious Speech and Printed Media
In Winter, two people followed the instructions of a mushroom
encyclopedia and became dangerously ill, but could not prove the
publisher liable for the content upon which they relied. In Rice,
however, the publisher of a Hit Man book was found liable for
76
causing the deaths of three people killed by a contract murderer.
The killer not only used a large number of instructions described in
the book, but also followed the methods identically in his

73. Arbitron Study, The Road Ahead Media and Entertainment in the Car, slide 38,
http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/The_Road_Ahead_2011.pdf.
74. Ashley Halsey III, 28 Percent of Accidents Involve Talking, Texting on
Cellphones, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/01/12/AR2010011202218.html.
75. Automobile Association of America, In the Driver’s Seat: New Auto Club Study
Shows Texting While Driving Is On the Rise (April 27, 2010) (on file with Hastings
Communications and Entertainment Law Journal).
76. Rice v. Paladin Enter., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
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perpetration of the crime. The man hired a contract killer, James
Perry, to kill his ex-wife, his eight-year-old quadriplegic son, and the
77
son’s nurse. The purpose of the killing was for the man to be able to
collect the $2 million dollar settlement that had been awarded the boy
as a result of his injuries. The court held that the book did not
contain speech protected by the First Amendment. The book
included specific instructions on creating a murder weapon, executing
the murder, and techniques to disguise the cause of death:
Using your six inch, serrated blade knife, stab deeply into the
side of the victim’s neck and push the knife forward in a
forceful movement. An ice pick can . . . be driven into the
victim’s brain, through the ear, after he has been subdued.
The wound hardly bleeds at all, and death is sometimes
78
attributed to natural causes.
The publisher’s wrongdoing here is hardly clearcut. According to
Winter and Braun, a publisher is not required to investigate the
contents of what he prints. However, Paladin Press “stipulated that it
specifically targeted the market of murderers, would-be murderers,
79
and other criminals for sale of its murder manual.” Paladin admitted
that it catered to people that would actually act upon the descriptive
instructions in the text. “Paladin has stipulated both that it had
knowledge and that it intended that Hit Man would immediately be
used by criminals and would-be criminals in the solicitation, planning,
80
and commission of murder and murder for hire.”
The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals asserted there was not even a shred of
material that contained any information that championed the values
of free speech that the First Amendment celebrates. Rather, the text
in the 130-page book was more like a set of specific steps instructing
potential criminals how to get ready for, perpetrate, and conceal a
81
Furthermore, the book was not merely a set of dry
murder.
instructions; it actually allayed concerns that one considering
committing murder might have, such as how they would feel after
82
committing the act. The text made these people feel better about
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83

going through with their intentions. And Paladin stipulated that,
through publishing and selling Hit Man, it ‘assisted’ Perry in the
84
perpetration of the brutal triple murders. It was precisely the book’s
content, coupled with Paladin’s stark and comprehensive stipulations,
85
which in the court’s words, were an “almost taunting defiance” that
fueled the court to have rule against Paladin and for Rice with no
hesitation.
However, broadcasters and other publishers joined in support of
Paladin, arguing that holding a publisher civilly liable for the acts of a
86
third party would conflict with the First Amendment. This, they
argued, could subject any magazine, book or film to liability. The
concern was articulated further by saying that anytime someone
watches a news report, for example, the broadcaster would be
worried about a copycat crime, and surely it would be unreasonable
for the nightly news to stop reporting on murders. The court,
however, effectively distinguished the present case:
In the ‘copycat’ context, it will presumably never be the case
that the broadcaster or publisher actually intends, through its
description or depiction, to assist another or others in the
commission of violent crime; rather, the information for the
dissemination of which liability is sought to be imposed will
actually have been misused vis-à-vis the use intended, not, as
87
here, used precisely as intended.
The court also mentioned that in most cases there will not be such
strong evidence in addition to the text itself, such as in the present
case, where the publisher admits to having purposefully sold the text
88
to help others commit a crime, “aid[ing] and abet[ting] murder.”
The court stated that even if a movie glamorizes murder, the fact it
was a Hollywood blockbuster film shows it was intended to entertain
89
and thus earn the studio a big profit. For example, a movie such as
Kill Bill: Vol. 1 shows that the movie studio, Miramax Films, had not
intended it to make it easier for someone to kill another person.
Miramax is clearly not intending to enable murderers. The purpose
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of the film has never been touted as anything other than
entertainment, as distinguished from Rice where the publisher
admitted its book was designed to help make the kill.
Moreover, in a news report, the journalist’s purpose is to educate
the community, not to make it easier for someone to repeat the crime,
90
as the book Hit Man did. Paladin ended up settling out of court, and
in addition to paying the family money, the publisher agreed to
91
destroy remaining copies of the book. While the idea of banning
books seems to be reminiscent of Ray Bradbury’s book Fahrenheit
451, a manual created to help someone complete a murder and cover
their tracks seems pretty clearly against the public interest.
Rice’s ruling certainly applies to injurious speech on the Internet.
In the age of global terrorism, if someone distributes a manual on
evading airport security and causing massive death through a terrorist
attack, and the publisher of such an online manual were to admit that
was his purpose, he should have to pay for any damage they cause if
someone follows the instructions and is successful. One of the more
dangerous aspects of Internet writings is the publisher’s ability to
spread such information for a very small transaction cost, and a
general inability to stop the spread of such harmful information. The
only way to hold these publishers accountable would be under Rice,
requiring a plaintiff to prove, via stipulation or otherwise, that the
publisher’s intent was to create a terrorist attack and that the work
was marketed for that purpose. Admittedly, in the Hit Man book
92
there were warnings that said “for academic study only!” But given
the context of the publisher’s statements that the book was intended
to help others kill, the court argues that the warnings were used to
make it seem even more realistic that if the person followed the
instructions, they would be able to commit a dangerous act.
Otherwise, why would they need to warn the reader not to do it?
This point relates well to the Internet because it is easy for a website
operator to require the writer of online manuals to write “do not
attempt” on the website of the previous terrorism example, but any
such requirement is likely negated by the extreme specificity with
which the procedures are described. Certainly a few words in a
disclaimer will not cancel out the many words that follow that appear
to advocate otherwise. Were Hit Man published online merely to

90. Id. at 266.
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glorify the killing of another human being, suppressing it would be a
violation of freedom of speech. But the fact that it was a step-by-step
instruction manual and the publisher’s intent was to help others kill,
its suppression likely saved lives.
The issue of injurious speech does not only arise in a publication’s
93
articles, but also in its advertisements. In Braun, a magazine was
found liable for an advertisement in its classified section. The “Gun
for Hire” ad was for a contract killer, Michael Savage, who was
seeking employment:
GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year old professional mercenary desires
jobs. Vietnam Veteran. Discrete [sic] and very private. Body
guard, courier, and other special skills. All jobs
94
considered. . .
Someone took Savage’s offer seriously. In 1985, Bruce Gastwirth
enlisted Savage’s services to kill Gastwirth’s business partner,
95
Richard Braun.
Braun’s son filed a civil suit against the gun
magazine that published the ad, Soldier of Fortune, and its publishing
96
company for his injuries and the wrongful death of his father.
Braun’s son suffered emotional injury from witnessing Savage’s
97
associate kill his father, as well as physical harm from the attack.
Given that the court was considering holding a publisher liable, the
court wanted to guard against a potential chilling effect that could
occur: a publisher may engage in self-censorship if the law imposed
too much of a burden on publishers about ads they feature in their
magazine. To ensure that the ruling would compensate the victim
and at the same time not chill speech, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals used a balancing test to see whether the likelihood the harm
would occur multiplied by the harm’s severity would outweigh the
98
defendant’s burden in taking safety precautions. Moreover the court
affirmed the district court’s test that the First Amendment allows “a
state to impose liability on a publisher for negligently publishing a
commercial advertisement where the ad on its face, and without the
need for investigation, makes it apparent that there is a substantial
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danger of harm to the public.” For example, the court notes that the
ad used language such as “gun for hire” and not only left open what
the gun would be hired for, but also intentionally used broad
language on two occasions, such as “other special skills” and “all jobs
considered,” which the court interpreted as including jobs that are
100
unlawful. While the ad does not say, “I can be hired to kill people,”
or “I have the skills and equipment necessary to kill someone, so
please hire me to do so,” the court stated that it was easy enough to
interpret that Savage could be hired to kill people, because that’s
101
certainly how Gastwirth read it.
While the First Amendment protects commercial speech, which
facilitates informed decision-making about financial matters, the First
Amendment does not protect commercial speech that involves
102
breaking the law, such as a wanted ad for the purchase of drugs.
Just like in Winter, the court Braun found that the publisher had no
duty to investigate. Although Braun held the publisher and magazine
liable, the result is entirely consistent with Winter because the
magazine in Braun still had no duty to investigate the ads. In fact,
Braun’s point is that the publisher does not need to investigate
because they will only be liable for an injury-causing ad when the
103
danger is apparent. Thus, the reason that it comports with the First
Amendment is twofold: The fact that a publisher has no duty to
investigate and the requirement that the information in the ad must
clearly cause “substantial” public danger.
This fits nicely within the digital landscape because injurious
speech may arise in an online advertisement. The Braun ruling is
especially relevant because virtually all magazines and newspapers
are publishing online. For example, a magazine that also publishes
online could have an ad that comes up in a pop-up or side-bar. In
fact, such advertising is the main way that magazines and newspapers
stay profitable online if they are not charging readers for
subscriptions.
The dissent in Braun, however, raised a
counterargument relating to the Internet: Not all ad spaces are
alike—there are billboard type advertisement spaces or the classified
section where the publisher may have less of a role.
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Despite the publisher’s low burden and lack of duty to investigate,
it is still possible a publisher may be liable for what it prints.
Moreover, the focus here is on websites for more traditional
publications, such as Time Magazine, which on their web site’s
104
The Braun
homepage has a section that says “sponsored links.”
ruling should certainly not create too tough a burden for a publication
on a website. If the publisher does not have enough sensibility to
know when an ad makes an offer to commit a “serious violent
105
crime,” then they probably should not be in the information
gathering business. We want to “chill” murder, so that both the gun
for hire and the client will have a harder time achieving their goals.
That is certainly applicable online, where a user can use a cloak of
anonymity with less fear they will get caught.
This case exemplifies how, when it comes to private victims,
courts may theoretically be able to draw a clear “content” line
between bullying speech that is offensive but protected and bullying
speech that is actionable despite the First Amendment. Practically,
however, the courts have a very difficult time making the distinctions
in a way that would not chill free speech. Even in Rice, while the
court held the publisher liable for a book’s injurious speech, the court
noted such a case was very rare because the publisher admitted it sold
106
the book to help others commit murder. Moreover, the court stated
the entire book was injurious speech. While it is true that defamation
cases involving private figures seem to allow legal actions against a
relatively wide range of speech, this paper does not address the tort of
defamation, which is not protected by the First Amendment. The
interesting challenge that injurious speech poses, and the reason it is
the exclusive focus of this paper, is that it addresses the tensions
involved between holding a party responsible for causing injury and
affirming First Amendment protections.
Importantly, while
cyberbullying may include “hate speech,” this paper does not focus
on injurious speech targeted at a protected group or at an individual
because they are a member of a protected group. Rather, this paper
focuses on injurious speech that can cause injury regardless of one’s
gender, race or religion.
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V. Proposal: Applying Staturory “Safe Harbors” to
Injurious Speech
In 1995, an unaired episode of The Jenny Jones Show garnered
national media attention. In front of a studio audience, a homosexual
man, Scott Amedure, confessed his secret affection for his
107
heterosexual friend, Jonathan Schmitz. Three days after the show’s
taping, Schmitz killed Amedure and was subsequently convicted of
second-degree murder. Amedure’s family sued The Jenny Jones
108
Show producers, claiming that they should have known about
Schmitz’s mental illness. Surely being confronted with such a surprise
could be traumatic for a person, especially when the announcement is
televised. Schmitz’s mental illness may have only exacerbated the
situation. It was precisely the effect of Amedure’s statements that
prompted Schmitz to act, leading to Amedure’s injury and death.
The show maintained that producers are not responsible for guests’
safety after they have left the studio. The issue of vicarious or
contributory liability for a TV station, book publisher, or Internet site
is thus very relevant.
Efforts to create statutory “safe harbors” from secondary liability,
as in vicarious or contributory liability similarly could be applied to
digital injurious speech. An example of this in the area of copyright
infringement is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(“DMCA”). The DMCA’s Title II establishes a “safe harbor” for
Internet service providers (“ISPs”), basically shielding them from
liability for copyright violations, if they adhere to certain
requirements. Namely, if a copyright holder notifies the ISP, they
must quickly prevent others from accessing the allegedly infringing
109
material.
DMCA “safe harbor” provisions could extend protection to
certain entities facing vicarious or contributory liability for injurious
speech torts if they satisfied similar requirements. Under such a legal
regime, an ISP would not be held liable for hosting a website that
features actionable injurious speech. For example, in a situation
where a group of teenagers sling insults at each other on Facebook,
the “notice and take down” rule for ISPs would only take effect if the
speech truly amounted injurious speech, which as we have seen in the
case law, is a very high threshold. The take down orders would likely
107. Michelle Green, TV’s Fatal Attraction, PEOPLE (Mar. 27, 1995), available at
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20105369,00.html.
108. Graves v. Warner Bros., 656 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
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not become weapons against expression because, as we have seen in
Weirum, speech becomes injurious only when it is the “foreseeable
110
result” of a situation that creates an “undue risk of harm.” In his
book, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It, Jonathan Zittrain
argues that the “notice and take down approach” effectively balances
competing concerns of removing content while not impinging on
111
Zittrain provides the example of the Internet
freedom of speech.
hosting site, Geocities, which should be able to host a home page
without fear of liability for the content on the page, as long as it
112
blocked and removed the content once it was notified of a violation.
This framework allowed free expression on the Internet to
continue, and Zittrain argues that these personal home pages were
113
“Had these
precursors to what we know as “blogs” today.
intermediaries stopped offering these services for fear of crushing
liability under a different legal configuration, people would have had
far fewer options to broadcast online: they could have either hosted
content through their own personal PCs, with several incumbent
114
shortcomings, or forgone broadcasting altogether.”
On the other
hand, one could argue that the ISP are in a great position to prevent
the injurious speech. After all, they could take acts that could reduce
the likelihood and severity of bad outcomes. Certainly they could do
some of their own policing to avoid injurious speech, and it is
especially bad press to have someone injured as a result of an online
radio broadcast. If indeed a party is harmed by injurious speech
online, who should bear the costs? Should it be the injured party, or
the party in the chain of benefit, such as the ISP? The directly
responsible party, for example the author of the injurious speech,
could be penniless, so the injured party might prefer to sue the ISP.
The anonymity of posters on the Internet creates another hurdle
to holding culpable parties responsible. Even if an individual had a
strong injurious speech case, they might have a great deal of difficulty
determining who deserves to be sued. But in the search for the
culpable party, we also don’t want to violate someone’s privacy. Just
like we might feel uncomfortable if a company always knew where we
visited in the physical world, so too would we feel uncomfortable if a
company knew where we visited in the virtual world.
110. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975).
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Those who argue that the “notice and take down” provisions, like
those in the DMCA, do too little too late, run headlong into problems
with prior restraint. Prior restraints to speech, “rather than punishing
115
are presumed
it after the fact if indeed it is unlawful”
116
unconstitutional. “Notice and take down” provisions are not prior
restraints and avoid this presumption.
Just as the DMCA’s “safe harbor” provisions exonerate an ISP
from liability for copyright infringement unless it is notified of the
infringement, so too should ISPs not be held responsible for injurious
speech that would subject the speaker to liability.

VI. Conclusion
Virtually all newspapers and magazines publish online. It seems
that we are more networked than ever, with television news stories
and programs streamed online, pervasive email communications,
blogs, and social networking sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, as well
as movies and films being distributed via iTunes. This frees speech
even more, but it also makes the implications for injurious speech on
the Internet have a wider scope. In examining the following cases in
117
118
119
120
print and broadcast, such as Hustler, Herceg, Winter, Olivia,
121
122
123
Weirum, Braun, and Rice, we have seen how courts have
attempted to strike a balance between freedom of speech and
expression and protecting people who suffer emotional or physical
harm. Moreover, I have tried to “link” each case to a digital
discussion, so that we can fully relate the issues courts have faced in
the past in order to understand their implications for the future.
Indeed, with the proliferation of discussion with regards to
cyberbullying, we have already seen this new framework in action.
One could argue that we have criminal law to punish criminals, and
making cyberbullying a crime poses too dangerous a risk to free
speech. Herceg, in ruling in favor of Hustler Magazine, recognized
that the power of speech can have disastrous consequences at times,
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but it is a right worth protecting even in those cases. Moreover, as the
court articulated in Olivia, unless the injurious speech incites unlawful
activity, a court will not hold the network civilly liable for their
broadcast. Even the book publisher in Winter, purporting itself to be
a reliable source of information, caused two people to develop such
serious health conditions as to require liver transplants, and was not
held liable.
At the same time, as the court ruled in Weirum, a broadcaster can
be held liable if it motivates dangerous behavior. Similarly, Braun
held a publisher accountable for advertising a “hired gun” because
the injurious effect of the speech in the ad was so clear, the publisher
did not even need to investigate to detect the harm. Sometimes, as in
Rice, criminal law is not enough, and the publisher quite literally has
to pay for its intentional facilitation of injurious speech, when it
amounts to aiding and abetting a murder. Judging by the case law, it
looks like Sanchez’s “Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act”
will face some obstacles to ensure it does not impermissibly restrict
free speech. Certainly it should be restricted to victims who are not
public figures, lest it run afoul of the Hustler case, which ensured that
the injurious speech would have to be interpreted as statement of fact
and also be “extreme or outrageous.”
While cyberbullying’s scope is not normally considered to apply
to public figures, the proposed statute, if it would pass First
Amendment constitutional muster, should nevertheless be narrowly
drafted as to reflect the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence involving
public figures. Despite the potential for greater “hurt” that injurious
speech may inflict via the Internet as opposed to broadcast channels
because of its ability to reach more people online, the speaker’s
ability to remain anonymous, and the low transaction costs involved
in creating injurious speech, the First Amendment protection should
not be reduced for this medium. While I may not agree with the
Supreme Court’s positing that the Internet may be allowed greater
First Amendment protection than for example, broadcast TV, I
would not argue that there be any less. The legal zone of immunity
should not be less because limiting free speech protections on the
Internet would chill writers and speakers in more traditional media,
given that much of what is written may be published on both print
and online. As much sincere sympathy for Megan Meier’s family as
there may be, under current case law and statutes neither Drew nor
MySpace could face liability for Meier’s death.
Finally, in considering the “safe harbor” provisions of the DMCA,
rather than holding ISPs accountable for content that users post
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online, it would likely be more effective to have a graduated response
system. For example, it may be worth exploring the same “notice and
takedown” provisions that have protected the copyright holder in the
intellectual property regime. These provisions could be applied to
ISPs, and thus they would not be responsible for removing injurious
speech unless they are notified and do not respond. For example, if a
person sends a message containing injurious speech and the victim
identifies and substantiates that the message caused them severe
emotional distress or resulted in physical harm, perhaps the ISPs can
be required to send a message to the user who wrote the injurious
speech. Of course, the threshold should be a very high one to even
consider involving the ISP in such a matter, so as not to jeopardize its
free speech protections. “Notice and takedown” certainly may be
one way to proceed in certain cases of “cyberbullying,” but is vital to
prevent ISPs from acting in an overprotective way to avoid liability
and future policy must be in line with First Amendment policy and
jurisprudence.

